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SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES
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No. 93-1504
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CELOTEX CORPORATION, PETITIONER v.
BENNIE EDWARDS et ux.
on writ of certiorari to the united states court
of appeals for the fifth circuit
[April 19, 1995]

  Justice Stevens, with whom Justice Ginsburg joins,
dissenting.
  Today the majority holds that an Article III court
erred when it allowed plaintiffs who prevailed on appeal
to collect on a supersedeas bond in the face of an injunc-
tion issued by a non-Article III judge.  Because, in my
view, the majority attaches insufficient weight to the
fact that the challenged injunction was issued by a non-
Article III judge, I respectfully dissent.

                            I
  The outlines of the problems I perceive are best drawn
by starting with an examination of the injunctions and
opinions issued by the bankruptcy judge in this case.
As the majority notes, Bennie and Joann Edwards (the
Edwards) won a tort judgment against Celotex for
damages Bennie Edwards suffered as a result of expo-
sure to asbestos.  To stay the judgment pending appeal,
Celotex arranged for Northbrook Property and Casualty
Insurance Company (Northbrook) to post a supersedeas
bond to cover the full amount of the judgment.  On
October 12, 1990, before Celotex filed its voluntary
petition under Chapter 11 of the Bankruptcy Code, the
Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit affirmed the
Edwards' judgment against Celotex.  It is undisputed

that, when the Edwards' judgment was affirmed, any
property interest that Celotex retained in the supersede-
as bond was extinguished.
  The filing of Celotex's bankruptcy petition on October
12, 1990, triggered the automatic stay provisions of the
Bankruptcy Code.  See 11 U. S. C. 362(a).  On October
17, 1990, the bankruptcy judge, acting pursuant to 11
U. S. C. 105(a), supplemented the automatic stay
provisions with an emergency order staying, inter alia,
all proceedings -involving any of the Debtors [i.e.,
Celotex].-  App. to Pet. for Cert. 28.  The supersedeas
bond filed in the Edwards' case, however, evidences an
independent obligation on the part of Northbrook.  For
that reason, neither the automatic stay of proceedings
against the debtor pursuant to 362(a) of the Bank-
ruptcy Code nor the bankruptcy judge's October 17,
105(a) stay restrained the Edwards from proceeding
against Northbrook to enforce Northbrook's obligations
under the bond.  As the Court of Appeals correctly held,
the October 17 order enjoined the prosecution of proceed-
ings involving -the Debtors,- but did not expressly enjoin
the Edwards from proceeding against Northbrook.  See
6 F. 3d 312, 315 (CA5 1993).
  On May 3, 1991, the Edwards commenced their
proceeding against Northbrook by filing a motion
pursuant to Rule 65.1 of the Federal Rules of Civil
Procedure to enforce the supersedeas bond.  Several
weeks later-on June 13, 1991-the Bankruptcy Court
entered a new three-paragraph order enjoining all of
Celotex's judgment creditors from collecting on their
supersedeas bonds.  Paragraph 1 of the order addressed
creditors whose appellate process had not yet concluded.
Paragraph 2 addressed creditors whose appellate process
concluded only after Celotex had filed for bankruptcy.
Paragraph 3 applied to judgment creditors, such as the
Edwards, whose appeals had concluded before the filing
of the bankruptcy petition.  Paragraph 3 expressly
precluded those creditors from proceeding against any
bond -without first seeking to vacate the Section 105
stay entered by this Court.-  In re Celotex Corp., 128
B. R. 478, 485 (Bkrtcy. Ct. MD Fla. 1991).
  The opinion supporting that order explains that Para-
graphs 1 and 2 rest in part on the theory that the
debtor retains a property interest in the supersedeas
bonds until the appellate process is complete, and any
attempt to collect on those bonds is therefore covered in
the first instance by 362(a)'s automatic stay provisions.
The opinion recognized that that rationale did not cover
supersedeas bonds posted in litigation with judgment
creditors, such as the Edwards, whose appellate process
was complete.  The bankruptcy judge concluded, howev-
er, that 105(a) gave him the power to stay the collec-
tion efforts of such bonded judgment creditors.  The
bankruptcy judge contended that other courts had
utilized the 105(a) stay -to preclude actions which may
`impede the reorganization process,'- id., at 483, quoting
In re Johns-Manville Corp., 837 F. 2d 89, 93 (CA2), cert.
denied, 488 U. S. 868 (1988), or -`which will have an
adverse impact on the Debtor's ability to formulate a
Chapter 11 plan,'- 128 B. R., at 483, quoting A. H.
Robins Co. v. Piccinin, 788 F. 2d 994 (CA4), cert.
denied, 479 U. S. 876 (1986).  But cf. n. 12, infra.
Apparently viewing his own authority as virtually
limitless, the bankruptcy judge described a general
bankruptcy power -to stop ongoing litigation and to
prevent peripheral court decisions from dealing with
issues . . . without first allowing the bankruptcy court
to have an opportunity to review the potential effect on
the debtor.-  128 B. R., at 484.  He concluded that in
-mega- cases in which -potential conflicts with other
judicial determinations- might arise, -the powers of the
bankruptcy court under Section 105 must in the initial
stage be absolute.-  Ibid.
  I do not agree that the powers of a bankruptcy judge,
a non-Article III judge, -must . . . be absolute- at the
initial stage or indeed at any stage.  Instead, the
jurisdiction and the power of bankruptcy judges are
cabined by specific and important statutory and constitu-
tional constraints that operate at every phase of a
bankruptcy.  In my view, those constraints require that
the judgment of the Court of Appeals be affirmed.
  The majority concludes that the Court of Appeals must
be reversed because the bankruptcy judge had jurisdic-
tion to issue the injunction and because the injunction
had more than a -`frivolous pretense to validity.'-  Ante,
at 13.  Even applying the majority's framework, I would
affirm the Court of Appeals.  As I will demonstrate, the
constraints on the jurisdiction and authority of the
bankruptcy judge compel the conclusion that the bank-
ruptcy judge lacked jurisdiction to issue the challenged
injunction, and that the injunction has only a -frivolous
pretense to validity.-  I will also explain, however, why
the majority's deferential approach seems particularly
inappropriate as applied to this particular injunction,
now in its fifth year of preventing enforcement of
supersedeas bonds lodged in an Article III court.

                           II
  In my view, the bankruptcy judge lacked jurisdiction
to issue an injunction that prevents an Article III court
from allowing a judgment creditor to collect on a super-
sedeas bond posted in that court by a nondebtor.  In
reaching the contrary conclusion, the majority relies
primarily on the bankruptcy judge's -related to- jurisdic-
tion, and thus I will address that basis of jurisdiction
first.  The majority properly observes that, under 28
U. S. C. 1334(b), the district court has broad bankruptcy
jurisdiction, extending to -all civil proceedings arising
under title 11, or arising in or related to cases under
title 11.-  The majority also notes correctly that the
Edwards' action to enforce the supersedeas bond is
within the district court's -related to- jurisdiction,
because allowing creditors such as the Edwards -to
execute immediately on the bonds would have a direct
and substantial adverse effect on Celotex's ability to
undergo a successful reorganization.-  Ante, at 10.  The
majority then observes that, under 28 U. S. C. 157(a),
the district court may -refe[r]- to the bankruptcy judge
-any or all cases under title 11 and any or all proceed-
ings arising under title 11 or arising in or related to a
case under title 11.-  Thus, the majority concludes
that, because the Edwards' action to enforce the superse-
deas bond was within the District Court's -related to-
jurisdiction and because the District Court referred all
matters to the bankruptcy judge, the bankruptcy judge
had jurisdiction over the Edwards' action.
  In my view, the majority's approach pays insufficient
attention to the remaining provisions of 157, and, more
importantly, to the decision of this Court that gave rise
to their creation.  The current jurisdictional structure of
the Bankruptcy Code reflects this Court's decision in
Northern Pipeline Constr. Co. v. Marathon Pipe Line Co.,
458 U. S. 50 (1982), which in turn addressed the
Bankruptcy Reform Act of 1978, 92 Stat. 2549.  The
1978 Act significantly restructured the Bankruptcy Code.
The Act created -bankruptcy courts- and vested in them
-jurisdiction over all `civil proceedings arising under title
11 [the Bankruptcy title] or arising in or related to
cases under title 11.'-  Northern Pipeline, 458 U. S., at
54, quoting 28 U. S. C. 1471(b) (1976 ed., Supp. IV).
As the plurality opinion in Northern Pipeline observed,
-[t]his jurisdictional grant empowers bankruptcy courts
to entertain a wide variety of cases,- involving -claims
based on state law as well as those based on federal
law.-  458 U. S., at 54.  The Act also bestowed upon the
judges of the bankruptcy courts broad powers to accom-
pany this expanded jurisdiction.  See infra, at __;
Northern Pipeline, 458 U. S., at 55.  The Act did not,
however, make the newly empowered bankruptcy judges
Article III judges.  In particular, it denied bankruptcy
judges the life tenure and salary protection that the
Constitution requires for Article III judges.  See U. S.
Const., Art. III, 1.
  In Northern Pipeline, this Court held that the Act was
unconstitutional, at least insofar as it allowed a non-
Article III court to -entertain and decide- a purely state
law claim.  458 U. S., at 91 (Rehnquist, J., concurring
in judgment); see also id., at 86 (plurality opinion).  The
plurality opinion distinguished the revamped bankruptcy
courts from prior district court -adjuncts- which the
Court had found did not violate Article III.  The plural-
ity noted that, in contrast to the narrow, specialized
jurisdiction exercised by these prior adjuncts, -the
subject-matter jurisdiction of the bankruptcy courts
encompasses not only traditional matters of bankruptcy,
but also `all civil proceedings arising under title 11 or
arising in or related to cases under title 11.'-  Id., at
85.  In addition, prior adjuncts -engaged in statutorily
channeled factfinding functions,- while the bankruptcy
courts -exercis[e] `all of the jurisdiction' conferred by the
Act on the district courts.-  Ibid.
  In response to Northern Pipeline, Congress passed the
Bankruptcy Amendments and Federal Judgeship Act of
1984 (1984 amendments), 98 Stat. 333.  Section 157 was
passed as part of the 1984 amendments.  Section 157
establishes two broad categories of proceedings: -core
proceedings- and -non-core proceedings.-  For -all core
proceedings arising under title 11, or arising in a case
under title 11 referred under [157(a)],- 157(b)(1)
permits bankruptcy judges to -hear and determine- the
proceedings and to -enter appropriate orders and
judgments.-  For noncore proceedings -otherwise related
to a case under title 11-, 157(c)(1) permits the bank-
ruptcy court only to -hear- the proceedings and to
-submit proposed findings of fact and conclusions of law
to the district court.-  See 1 Collier -3.01[1][c][iv], at
3-28 (-Civil proceedings `related to cases under title 11'-
are -excluded from being treated as `core proceedings' by
28 U. S. C. 157(b)(1), and are the subject of special
procedures contained in section 157(c)(1) and (c)(2)-).
For these -related proceedings,- 1 Collier -3.01[1][c][iv],
at 3-28, only the district court has the power to enter
-any final order or judgment.-
  In my view, the distinction between the jurisdiction to
-hear and determine- core proceedings on the one hand
and the jurisdiction only to -hear- related proceedings on
the other hand is critical, if not dispositive.  I believe
that the jurisdiction to hear (and yet not to determine)
a case under 157(c)(1) provides insufficient jurisdiction
to a bankruptcy judge to permit him to issue a binding
injunction that prevents an Article III court from
exercising its conceded jurisdiction over the case.  The
unambiguous text of 157(c)(1) requires that the bank-
ruptcy judge's participation in related proceedings be
merely advisory rather than adjudicative.  In my view,
having jurisdiction to grant injunctions over cases that
one may not decide is inconsistent with such an advisory
role.  An injunction is an extraordinary remedy whose
impact on private rights may be just as onerous as a
final determination.  The constitutional concerns that
animate the current jurisdictional provisions of the
Bankruptcy Code and that deny non-Article III tribunals
the power to determine private controversies apply with
equal force to the entry of an injunction interfering with
the exercise of the admitted jurisdiction of an Article III
tribunal.
  In sum, my view on the sufficiency of -related to-
jurisdiction to sustain the injunction in this case can be
stated quite simply: If a bankruptcy judge lacks jurisdic-
tion to -determine- a question, the judge also lacks
jurisdiction to issue an injunction that prevents an
Article III court, which concededly does have jurisdiction,
from determining that question.  Any conclusion to
the contrary would trivialize the constitutional impera-
tives that shaped the Bankruptcy Code's jurisdictional
provisions.

                           III
  Petitioners and the majority rely primarily on -related
to- jurisdiction.  Indeed, the Court's holding appears to
rest almost entirely on the view that a bankruptcy judge
has jurisdiction to enjoin proceedings in Article III
courts whenever those proceedings are -related to- a
pending Title 11 case.  See ante, at 7-11.  Two footnotes
in the Court's opinion, however, might be read as
suggesting alternative bases of jurisdiction.  See ante, at
3, n. 4, 11, n. 8.  Those two footnotes require a brief
response.
  In footnote 4 of its opinion, the Court refers to two
different claims advanced by Celotex in the bankruptcy
proceedings: a claim that -the bonded judgment creditors
should not be able to execute on their bonds because, by
virtue of the collateralization of the bonds, the bonded
judgment creditors are beneficiaries of Celotex asset
transfers that are voidable as preferences and fraudulent
transfers-; and a claim that -the punitive damages por-
tions of the judgments can be voided or subordinated.-
There is little doubt that those claims are properly
characterized as ones -arising under- Title 11 within the
meaning of 28 U. S. C. 1334(b); however, it does not
necessarily follow from that characterization that the
bankruptcy judge had jurisdiction to issue the injunction
in support of the prosecution of those claims.  Celotex's
complaint was not filed until months after the bank-
ruptcy judge's injunction issued.  The claims raised in
that complaint cannot retroactively provide a jurisdic-
tional basis for the bankruptcy judge's injunction.
  Moreover, Celotex's attempts to set aside the
Edwards' supersedeas bond are patently meritless.  It
strains credulity, to suggest that a supersedeas bond,
posted almost a year and a half before the bankruptcy
petition was filed, could be set aside as a preference or
as a fraudulent transfer for the benefit of Celotex's ad-
versaries in bitterly contested litigation.  Conceivably,
Celotex's provision of security to Northbrook might be
voidable, but that possibility could not impair the rights
of the judgment creditors to enforce the bond against
Northbrook even though they might be unwitting benefi-
ciaries of the fraud.  That possibility, at most, would be
relevant to the respective claims of Northbrook and
Celotex to the pledged collateral.  Similarly, the fact
that the Edwards' judgment included punitive as well as
compensatory damages does not provide even an argu-
able basis for reducing Northbrook's obligations under
the supersedeas bond.  Even if there is a basis for
subordinating a portion of Northbrook's eventual claim
against Celotex on -bankruptcy law grounds,- that has
nothing to do with the Edwards' claim against
Northbrook.  It thus seems obvious that, at least with
respect to the Edwards, Celotex has raised frivolous
claims in an attempt to manufacture bankruptcy juris-
diction and thereby to justify a bankruptcy judge's
injunction that had been issued over one year earlier.
Cf. Siler v. Louisville & Nashville R. Co., 213 U. S. 175,
191 (1909) (-Of course, the Federal question must not
be merely colorable or fraudulently set up for the mere
purpose of endeavoring to give the court jurisdiction-).
  In its footnote 8, the Court appears to suggest that
the injunction prohibiting the Edwards from proceeding
against Northbrook (described in the footnote as the
-stay proceeding-) may -aris[e] under- Title 11 or may
-arise in- the Title 11 case.  Perhaps this is accurate in
a literal sense: the injunction did, of course, -arise
under- Title 11 because 11 U. S. C. 105(a) created
whatever power the bankruptcy judge had to issue the
injunction.  Similarly, the injunction -arises in- the Title
11 case because that is where it originated.  It cannot
be the law, however, that a bankruptcy judge has juris-
diction to enter any conceivable order that a party
might request simply because 105(a) authorizes some
injunctions or because the request was first made in a
pending Title 11 case.  Cf. 2 Collier -105.01[1], at
105-2 (Section 105 -is not an independent source of
jurisdiction, but rather it grants the courts flexibility to
issue orders which preserve and protect their jurisdic-
tion-).  The mere filing of a motion for a 105 injunc-
tion to enjoin a proceeding in another forum cannot be
a jurisdictional bootstrap enabling a bankruptcy judge to
exercise jurisdiction that would not otherwise exist.

                           IV
  Even if I believed that the bankruptcy judge had
jurisdiction to issue its injunction, I would still affirm
the Court of Appeals because in my view the bank-
ruptcy judge's injunction has only a -frivolous pretense
to validity.-
  In 1898, Congress codified the bankruptcy laws.
Under the 1898 Bankruptcy Act, most bankruptcy pro-
ceedings were conducted by -referees- who resolved
controversies involving property in the actual or con-
structive possession of the court, as well as certain
disputes involving property in the possession of third
parties.  In 2(a)(15) of the 1898 Act, Congress vested
in bankruptcy courts the power to:
-[M]ake such orders, issue such process, and enter
such judgments in addition to those specifically
provided for as may be necessary for the enforce-
ment of the provisions of this Act.-  Act of July 1,
1898, 30 Stat. 546.
In 1938, Congress clarified both the powers and the
limitations on the injunctive authority of referees in
bankruptcy by adding to the end of 2(a)(15), -Provided,
however, That an injunction to restrain a court may be
issued by the judge only.-  52 Stat. 843 (emphasis in
original).
  In 1978, through the Bankruptcy Reform Act, Con-
gress significantly revised the Bankruptcy Code and the
role of bankruptcy referees.  Though stopping short of
making bankruptcy referees Article III judges, Congress
significantly increased the status, the duties, and the
powers of those referees.  For example, as we noted in
Northern Pipeline, the expanded powers under the new
Act included -the power to hold jury trials, to issue
declaratory judgments, [and] to issue writs of habeas
corpus under certain circumstances.-  458 U. S., at 55.
In addition, Congress again provided for broad injunc-
tive powers.  Thus, for example, in the place of
2(a)(15), Congress added 11 U. S. C. 105, which pro-
vided in relevant part: -The bankruptcy court may issue
any order, process, or judgment that is necessary or
appropriate to carry out the provisions of this title.-
See also 458 U. S., at 55 (-Congress has allowed bank-
ruptcy judges the power . . . to issue all writs necessary
in aid of the bankruptcy court's jurisdiction-).  Once
again, however, along with both this marked expansion
of the power of bankruptcy judges and the broad delega-
tion of injunctive authority, Congress indicated its in-
tent to limit the power of those judges to enjoin other
courts: Although Congress provided that -[a] bankruptcy
court shall have the powers of a court of equity, law,
and admiralty,- it also provided that bankruptcy courts
-may not enjoin another court.-  28 U. S. C. 1481
(1982 ed.).  Thus, for well over 50 years prior to the
adoption of the 1984 amendments to the Bankruptcy
Code, it was clear that Congress intended to deny bank-
ruptcy judges the power to enjoin other courts.
  The 1984 amendments, inter alia, repealed 1481 (and
its express limitation on injunctive authority), leaving
105 as the only source of the bankruptcy judge's in-
junctive authority.  Given that Northern Pipeline re-
quired a contraction in the authority of bankruptcy
judges, and given that the 1984 amendments regard-
ing the powers of the bankruptcy courts were passed to
comply with Northern Pipeline, it would be
perverse-and in my view -frivolous--to contend that
Congress intended the repeal of 1481 to operate as an
authorization for those judges to enjoin proceedings in
other courts, thus significantly expanding the powers of
bankruptcy judges.
  My view of the consequence of the 1984 amendments
is reinforced by the structure of 1481.  When Congress
placed restrictions on the injunctive power of the bank-
ruptcy courts, it did so in 1481, right after the clause
granting those courts -the powers of a court of equity,
law, and admiralty.-  In my view, this suggests that
Congress saw 1481-and not 105(a)-as the source of
any power to enjoin other courts.  Thus, the removal of
1481 by the 1984 amendments is properly viewed as
eliminating the sole source of congressionally-granted
authority to enjoin other courts.  Cf. In re Hipp, 895
F. 2d 1503, 1515-1516 (CA5 1990) (concluding on simi-
lar reasoning that 1481, not 105(a), was the source of
the bankruptcy court's power to punish criminal con-
tempt under the 1978 Act).
  Nor does anything in the 1986 amendments to the
Bankruptcy Code alter my analysis.  The primary
effect of those amendments was to give the bankruptcy
judges the power to issue orders sua sponte.  The
1986 amendments, therefore, do not reflect any expan-
sion of the power of bankruptcy judges to enjoin other
courts.
  The bankruptcy judge's error with respect to this
injunction thus seems clear, and the injunction falls,
therefore, within the exception recognized by the major-
ity for injunctions with only a -frivolous pretense to
validity.-  I recognize, of course, that one may legiti-
mately question the -frivolousness- of the injunction in
light of the Fourth Circuit's upholding the very injunc-
tion at issue in this case, see Willis v. Celotex Corp.,
978 F. 2d 146 (1992), cert. denied, 507 U. S. __ (1993),
and the disagreement of a substantial number of my
colleagues.  In my view, however, the bankruptcy
judge's error is sufficiently plain that the Court of Ap-
peals was justified in allowing the Edwards to collect on
their bond.

                            V
  The Court's holding today rests largely on its view
that the Edwards' proper remedy is to appeal the bank-
ruptcy judge's injunction, first to the District Court and
then to the Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit.
The Court concedes, however, that the Edwards need
not do so if the bankruptcy judge exceeded his jurisdic-
tion, or if the injunction is supported by nothing more
than -a frivolous pretense to validity.-  Ante, at 6.  For
the reasons already stated, I think both of those condi-
tions are satisfied in this case.  The non-Article III
bankruptcy judge simply lacked both jurisdiction and
authority to prevent an Article III court from exercising
its unquestioned jurisdiction to decide a matter that is
related only indirectly to the bankruptcy proceeding.  I
think it important, however, to add a few brief words
explaining why I find this injunction especially troubling
and why the injunction should be viewed with a particu-
larly critical eye.
  First, the justification offered by the bankruptcy judge
should give the court pause.  As originally articulated,
the justification for this injunction was that emergency
relief was required lest the reorganization of Celotex
become impossible and liquidation follow.  Apart from
the fact that the -emergency- rationale is plainly insuffi-
cient to support an otherwise improper injunction that
has now lasted for more than four years, the judge's
reasoning reveals reliance on the misguided notion that
a good end is a sufficient justification for the existence
and exercise of power.  His reference to the need to
exercise -absolute- power to override -potential conflicts
with other judicial determinations- that might have a
-potential impact on the debtor- should invite far more
exacting scrutiny of his order than the Court deems
appropriate.
  Second, that the subject of the injunction was a super-
sedeas bond makes the injunction suspect.  A supersede-
as bond may be viewed as putting the integrity of the
Court in which it is lodged on the line.  As the Court of
Appeals noted, the Edwards were -promised by the
court- that the supersedeas bond would be available if
they prevailed on appeal.  6 F. 3d, at 320.  For that
reason, in my opinion, questions relating to the enforce-
ability of a supersedeas bond should generally be an-
swered in the forum in which the bond is posted.
  Moreover, whenever possible, such questions should be
resolved before the court accepts the bond as security
for collection of the judgment being appealed.  After a
debtor has benefitted from the postponement of collec-
tion of an adverse judgment, both that debtor and its
successors-in-interest should normally be estopped from
asserting that the judgment creditors who relied to their
detriment on the validity of the bond had no right to do
so.  The very purpose of a supersedeas bond is to pro-
tect judgment creditors from the risk that insolvency of
the debtor may impair their ability to enforce the judg-
ment promptly.  When the bond has served the purpose
of forestalling immediate levies on the judgment debtor's
assets-levies that might have precipitated an earlier
bankruptcy-it is inequitable to postpone payment mere-
ly because the risk against which the bond was intend-
ed to provide protection has actually occurred.  See id.,
at 319 (-It is manifestly unfair to force the judgment
creditor to delay the right to collect with a promise to
protect the judgment only to later refuse to allow that
successful plaintiff to execute the bond because the
debtor has sought protection under the laws of bank-
ruptcy-); In re Southmark, 138 B. R. 820, 827-828
(Bkrtcy. Ct. ND Tex. 1992) (internal quotation marks
omitted) (-The principal risk against which such bonds
are intended as a protection is insolvency.  To hold that
the very contingency against which they guard shall, if
it happens, discharge them, seems to us bad law and
worse logic-).  The inequity that the Court today con-
dones does not, of course, demonstrate that its legal
analysis is incorrect.  It does, however, persuade me
that the Court should not review this case as though it
presented an ordinary collateral attack on an injunction
entered by an Article III court.  Instead, the Court
should, I believe, more carefully consider which of the
two competing tribunals is guilty of trespassing in the
other's domain.
  Accordingly, I respectfully dissent.